Showing posts with label Phillip Mann. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Phillip Mann. Show all posts

Friday, July 09, 2010

Phillip Mann's Alternative History


[Phillip Mann: A Land fit for Heroes. Vol. 1: Escape to the Wild Wood (1993)]


  • Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 1: Escape to the Wild Wood. 1993. London: VGSF, 1994.

  • Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 2: Stand Alone Stan. London: Victor Gollancz, 1994.

  • Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 3: The Dragon Wakes. London: Victor Gollancz, 1995.

  • Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 4: The Burning Forest. London: Victor Gollancz, 1996.


On the one hand this seems a lot weaker than Phillip Mann's "straight" Science Fiction; on the other hand I find myself compulsively reading and rereading the various volumes in the series as if I were hoping to find some kind of master-key to their meaning.

One reason for this was (I suspect) because they were so difficult to obtain. The first one I bought in paperback quite straightforwardly, but after that copies of each successive volume seemed less and less easily accessible, until I was forced to wait to read the last one of all until it came up in a library sale! This might well have been an accidental impression, but I did get the sense that Mann's publisher was less and less behind him as the series continued.

Which is a pity, really. The division into volumes is actually pretty arbitrary. This is one long novel, divided into four parts, and I can't help wondering if the author wouldn't have preferred to see it that way: combined in one volume. That would be the best way to read it, I feel.

There are two basic aspects to the book. On the one hand it's a kind of British "wood-fantasy", in the vein of Alan Garner, or Ian Watson's Coming of Vertumnus (1994), or (above all) Robert Holdstock's Mythago Wood (1984) and its various sequels.

On the other hand, it's an alternative history novel, in the distinguished tradition of predecessors such as Keith Roberts' Pavane (1968), Kingsley Amis's The Alteration (1976), or (more appropriately, in this case) Robert Silverberg's Roma Eterna (2003).

As a fantasy work, the comparison with Mythago Wood immediately puts it in its place, I feel. Holdstock's notion of a forest which entraps all past time in a kind of vortex of Jungian archetypes is so compelling that it has even survived a number of increasingly attenuated sequels to this fine first novel (Lavondyss is the worst, The Bone Forest probably the best, but it's hard to see that any of them add much to the power of this original idea). Mann's wild wood, on the other hand, never really seems really out of control, even at the end when supernatural forces somehow take over the defence of the Island of Britain against its rationalist Roman overlords.

His ecological credentials are impeccable, mind you. And I have the greatest sympathy for the set of priorities he's arguing for in this book (as in his work as a whole), but I never feel exactly frightened or threatened by it as I do by Holdstock's Ryhope Wood (or even Old Man Willow in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings).

As a work of science fiction, on the other hand, his conception of a world "12 seconds away" from ours is nicely managed, I think. It's certainly in no way inferior to Silverberg's own version of a Roman Imperium surviving into the modern world. I'm not sure if Silverberg knew that Mann had preceded him with this idea (not that it's a particularly novel one: Brian Aldiss, among others, had used it before either of them), but his own novel definitely made more of a stir.

Why? I think it probably came down to that decision to release the book in four separate parts, again. Silverberg's came in one massive volume: Mann's took me literally years (I'm not exaggerating) to collect together. I'm very proud of my set of Mann-ian Hardbacks, but it's a shame that so many of them appear to be discards from the public library system (albeit pretty well-thumbed ones).

I believe in Mann's Romans as I find it difficult to do with his Woodlanders (let alone his fairies or trees). Nor am I really confident that I understand the meaning of his title: "A Land fit for Heroes". The term, as I understand it, has generally been used ironically - as a contrast between the promised and real futures provided for World War One veterans once they came home from the front. Is that how Mann means it, too? The "heroes" in question must surely be his rather William Morris-like (News from Nowhere) working-class Englishmen. And yet throughout the book they seem more like victims of forces they can't control than intelligent shapers of their own destiny.

There is, finally, a lack of poignancy about the book: a kind of impersonal preachiness which dominates the fates of the individual characters: Coll and Miranda disappear into a kind of mystic haze at the end, and Angus too seems robbed of all revolutionary purpose by the huge black dome which threatens to swallow up his world.

The protagonists of Mann's earlier books - Pawl Paxwax, Jon Wilberfoss, above all Angelo the part-android - had the property of somehow transcending the books they were in. The same might be said of the trio of Angus, Miranda and Viti in the first few volumes of Mann's tetralogy, but not, unfortunately, in the last one.

It is, of course, a very ambitious concept (Perhaps - I'm tempted to speculate - Phillip Mann was finally trying to rival his great namesake's tetralogy of monstrously complex historical novels, Joseph and His Brothers (1933-43) ...). The fact that it doesn't quite satisfy hasn't stopped me - as I mentioned above - reading and rereading it. There's so much to like and admire in Mann's 1,000-odd pages: Ulysses and the Emperor's strange visions in the Great Pyramid, the detailed account of the workings of the Battle Dome, Wildwood electrics as expounded by Angus ...

If it's a failure, it's a magnificent failure: one more on the scale of Victor Hugo's Les Miserables than your average Sci-fi series which fails to live up to the promise of its first volume (Farmer's Riverworld series, Niven's Ringworld, Clarke's Rama novels). I don't really believe it is a failure, though. It may not work quite so well as some of his earlier novels, but it leaves me full of hope for the next Mannian work we encounter.


[Phillip Mann: A Land fit for Heroes. Vol. 2: Stand Alone Stan (1994)]

Wednesday, July 07, 2010

Phillip Mann's Wulfsyarn


Or, The Ghost in the Machine

[Phillip Mann: Wulfsyarn: A Mosaic (1990)]

Rather poignant, that "New Zealand Author" label, don't you think? Sounds more like a government health warning than a recommendation ...

Wulfsyarn is the first of Mann's books I read, and I still find it one of his most perplexing. The basic notion is simple enough: Wulf, a cybernetic autoscribe, is recording the story of John Wilberfoss, disgraced captain of the ship Nightingale, which disappeared on its maiden voyage. When it was found again there was no-one on board but its captain, and he was - to all intents and purposes - mad.

Lily, the robot nurse, and Wulf, the secretary to the abbot of the Pacifico Monastery, are trying to coax Wilberfoss back to health and sanity in order to find out what happened to him and all the others, human and extraterrestrial, who were on board the immense hospital ship at the time.

The problem (as usual in these cases) is that one becomes more and more interested in Wulf and his perceptions of the (for want of a better word) "human" world, and less and less interested in Wilberfoss's various dilemmas and crises of faith as the story continues.

Or at least that's how I felt the first time I read it. Rereading it with more knowledge of Mann's specific interests and concerns: the ecology of alien lifeforms, the dark effects of human lack of self-knowledge, I began to see the form of the book more clearly. It is, in essence, an updated version of Coleridge's Rime of the Ancient Mariner, complete with the crew of dead comrades, the death of the albatross (in this case the alien parasitic creature called Quelle [German for "source"], together with its host, the silly young shepherd Sandy), the "Nightmare death-in-life", and then the eventual return home. Wilberfoss's "crime" seems more and more attenuated and difficult to define as the narrative proceeds - but (like the Mariner's) it stems from some kind of arrogance and sense of self-sufficiency which inspires him to flout the laws of nature.

The actual blame for the destruction of the ship lies far more with the Quelle than with Wilberfoss - but it's really the consequence of a series of coincidences and mischances (the Quelle's decision to infect the ship's bio-crystalline computers with its own self-hatred and self-doubt; the sudden windstorm which confuses the ship's sensors on the alien planet just long enough to accomplish the destruction of every other living thing on board; and (finally) the noble self-sacrifice of the windborne alien, the Chi-da, which Wilberfoss has met and made friends with on the planet when the damaged ship is unable to reach escape velocity). About this last event Wulf makes a telling point:

I am struck by the fact that Wilberfoss, at all points in his life, had visions. The visions were an objective expression of his passions. Perhaps they have real existence in another world. Perhaps the human mind has access to this other world. I do not. Among Wilberfoss's visions I included his beloved Chi-da. I have come to the opinion that if I had been down there on that grey world with Wilberfoss, then I would not have seen any creature which covered the sky like a banner of rippling red silk. [286-87]

Did any of it happen at all? Where is the boundary between "real" and "visionary" events in Wilberfoss's story? It is, after all, literally "a tale told by an idiot" - or at any rate by the self-destructive, psychologically-damaged sole survivor of a cataclysmic disaster. It's natural both for him to blame himself, and to look for clues to what went wrong in his own nature (especially in this case, when the ship's bio-crystalline mind was organically linked to and modelled on that of its commander).

Wulf goes on to say of this benevolent Other, the Chi-da, at the end of his "mosaic", his reconstruction of Wilberfoss's story: "he did not kill it. You cannot kill such things. He allowed it fulfilment, at the last." [287]






[Noel O'Hare, "An Alien at My Table." NZ Listener (August 20, 1994): 38-40.]

I hope the Listener doesn't mind my reproducing this Jane Ussher photograph from the feature-article on Phillip Mann they published back in the Nineties. If so, I apologise. Some interesting things came up in Noel O'Hare's interview, which is why I cut it out and kept it at the time.

"If I'm not careful, I could let the characters becomes too forceful," he says. Mann has a reputation for doing really good aliens. The most unlikely creatures populate his pages: the Hooded parasol, a floating canopy that kills its prey by smell; Diphilus, a jelly ball of illogic logic that devastates computers: the Hammer, a weta-like alien with a deep sense of humour; Wulf, a mechanical autoscribe and analyst of human psychology .. the alien parade goes on. [39]

It's interesting that O'Hare includes Wulf among this "parade" of aliens. I'm not sure that's the point Mann means to make with him. He is, after all, a robot - albeit a "semi-sentient" biocrystalline brain has been implanted in him along the way. Is that the same thing as these other organic, albeit wildly exotic, species?

Mann lives his work, and is possessed by the tale he is telling. "When I sit down to write, I very quickly go into a bit of a trance. I slide into that world very easily, and what I'm doing is totally real to me." [39]

Perhaps that's one reason why it's very hard to distinguish visionary experience and "real" events in the SF landscapes he creates - particularly in Wulfsyarn. This deliberate confusion of levels, somewhat bewildering (I suspect) to fans of (so-called) hardcore science fiction, seems inspired as much by ideology as the demands of the story (if one can draw so facile a distinction between the two, that is):

"I don't have a platform, a political point of view. I'm inconsistent. I'll contradict myself, but sweeping through everything is a worry about what happens if you destroy things, what happens if we destroy this wonderful bloody world." [40]

Mann's "novels of ideas" (to use O'Hare's phrase) are, nevertheless, novels - and ought to be judged and assessed as such:
" ... The rules that govern the writing of a science-fiction novel are exactly the same as for any other literature. Absolutely.

"I don't think science fiction's easier. It's often harder, because you have to maintain the reader's confidence in your ability to stay up there like a balloon. You're floating there and you don't have normal everyday life to support you." [40]








Which brings me to my next point.

I guess that New Zealand readers still know Samuel Butler primarily as the author of Erewhon (1872) and Erewhon Revisited (1901), and those as much for their New Zealand setting as for their - somewhat laboured - dystopian satire. He was also a considerable Classical scholar, and turned his hand to a translation of Homer (as well as writing a number of books and essays elaborating his theory that the author of the Odyssey - at least - was, in fact, a woman).

Here's a passage from his version of the Iliad (Bk XVIII: ll.368 and following):

Meanwhile Thetis came to the house of Vulcan, imperishable, star-bespangled, fairest of the abodes in heaven, a house of bronze wrought by the lame god's own hands. She found him busy with his bellows, sweating and hard at work, for he was making twenty tripods that were to stand by the wall of his house, and he set wheels of gold under them all that they might go of their own selves to the assemblies of the gods, and come back again - marvels indeed to see. They were finished all but the ears of cunning workmanship which yet remained to be fixed to them: these he was now fixing, and he was hammering at the rivets.

- Homer. The Iliad & The Odyssey. Trans. Samuel Butler. 1898. Great Books of the Western World, 4. Ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins. 1952. Chicago: William Benton, Publisher / Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 1989.

This passage, from the long description of the forging by the lame god Hephaestus of a new set of armour for Achilles, seems exceptionally interesting to me (especially given Mann's description of Wulf, the autoscribe: "I am told in shape I resemble a helmet of the type used by the Greek warriors at the battle of Troy. If that helps you visualise me, all well and good. But you must also realize that I am four and a half feet high from my base to the top of my crest." [12], though I doubt any direct reference was intended).

While it may not be the very earliest allusion in literature to something resembling the modern conception of a robot (that honour should probably go to the stone rowers destroyed in a fit of pique by the immortality-seeking hero of The Epic of Gilgamesh), it's fascinating to see how far back the idea does in fact go.

These twenty wheeled tripods, whose sole function is (apparently) "to go of their own selves to the assemblies of the gods, and come back again," in fact resemble modern Mars rovers and factory automatons far more than the original "robots" of the Čapek brothers' 1920's play (R.U.R. - Rossum's Universal Robots - to be exact).

One could go on to trace the idea of semi- (or wholly) sentient artificial life-form through the medieval Golem legend, through Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818), the life-like animated doll Olimpia in E. T. A Hoffmann's "The Sandman" (1816), through the surgically altered beastmen in H. G. Wells's Island of Doctor Moreau (1896), through Maria's evil android alter-ego in Fritz Lang's Metropolis (1927), all the way up to Data (in Star Trek) and Arnold Schwarzenegger's Terminator. But what makes them so perennially fascinating to us? Why do we keep on returning to this topos: the "android theme" (for want of a better term)?

I suppose that Descartes and Cartesian rationalism has to take at least part of the responsibility (or the blame). For Descartes (as I understand him, at any rate), what you do is the only valid source of information on what you are. Thus, there can be no useful discussion of essence separate from function. His famous apothegm "I think, therefore I am," is therefore intended to define humanity in terms of its capacity for rational thought.

The Wikipedia article on Descartes has (characteristically) a great deal more to say on the subject. I quote:

Descartes ... suggested that the body works like a machine, that it has the material properties of extension and motion, and that it follows the laws of physics. The mind (or soul), on the other hand, was described as a nonmaterial entity that lacks extension and motion, and does not follow the laws of physics. Descartes argued that only humans have minds, and that the mind interacts with the body at the pineal gland. This form of dualism or duality proposes that the mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence the otherwise rational mind, such as when people act out of passion.

This body-machine gives us (in a sense) our robot: Cartesianism made apparent (I was about to say, made flesh - made metal, rather). But where, then, is the soul in such an entity? Even a machine must (after all) have some kind of mind to guide it if it is to exhibit independent choice. Can it also, then, be subject to human passions? Hence Wulf's somewhat awkwardly-phrased disavowals of pure "objectivity", in the opening pages of his story:

... I want to warn you that though parts of this book will seem objective, even one might say God-given, they are not. My serviced and elaborated brain, almost I want to say my mind, like a colour filter placed over a camera lens, has given the entire work a peculiar cast of thought. As I have discovered, it is one of the paradoxes of biography that in straining to reveal my man, I have unavoidably revealed myself. So be it. [9]

The robot, then, is a kind of metaphor for interrogating reality. If something intangible can survive the process of manufacture, can manifest itself in a non-human intelligence, might that not offer us some clues about the nature of things as they are, not simply as we perceive them? For Descartes (like the cylons in Battlestar Galactica this meant, above all, one possible way of gathering clues about the identity (or existence?) of God.

Descartes suggested that the pineal gland is "the seat of the soul" ... although [he] realized that both humans and animals have pineal glands, he believed that only humans have minds. This led him to the belief that animals cannot feel pain, and Descartes' practice of vivisection (the dissection of live animals) became widely used throughout Europe until the Enlightenment. Cartesian dualism set the agenda for philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem for many years after Descartes' death.

Wulf puts it somewhat differently:

Wilberfoss's only comment when he read my manuscript was that he was surprised at how human I sounded. I think he meant it as a compliment. Let me turn it on its head .... it is not difficult to sound like a human. But being a human is not easy. I know., I have watched the struggle. I have heard humans affirming lies and denying truths. I have seen people choose hell over heaven and rejoice in the fact. [15]

"How human I sounded." Wilberfoss's compliment brings me to another locus classicus for the cybernetic intelligence: the Turing machine.

Alan Turing is well-known, of course, as the mathematician who was hounded to death by the British establishment after the Second World War because it was thought that, despite his undoubted brilliance, his homosexuality made him an automatic security risk. The "Turing machine" began as a hypothetical device capable of infinite numbers of calculations in finite time which he postulated to get him around a problem in mathematical logic. This initial concept grew, partly as a result of his work on the code-breaking machines at Bletchley Park during the war, into something like a blueprint for the modern binary computer.

One extension of this idea was the (so-called) Turing Test (pretty familiar territory to all readers of classical, golden-age science fiction, but maybe not so well-known to everyone else). In essence, the Turing test says that if you can't tell the difference between a real person and an intelligent machine after conducting a fairly extensive conversation with both of them through a text-only medium such as a computer screen and keyboard, then there is no difference. The perfect simulation is the thing itself (you can see why this notion has so delighted SF writers and readers down the years).

Certainly this is the territory within which Wulf is operating in the opening chapters of Mann's novel. As he himself puts it:

I know a great deal about human love from observation. I know for example that love and vanity can have a close relationship in the human psyche though superficially they are frequently seen as opposed. [14]

Is there any real difference in practice between Wulf's observations and "real" people's practice, though? Like Max Beerbohm's happy hypocrite, has he not become the thing he set out to counterfeit? Certainly he and his fellow automaton Lily have shown greater love to Wilberfoss than any of his fellow humans appear to have been capable of, given their automatic assumption that, as its captain, he was solely responsible for the loss of the Nightingale and its crew.

These are deep waters. Wulfsyarn is a fascinating meditation on the nature of the "human" and the "alien" (whether cybernetic or organic), and - above all - the maddening perversity of the former:

People sometimes miss the point. "Aliens are always ways of talking about us. Okay, they might be a bit strange, but really, if you look at them closely, they're us in their passions, in their complex situations." [O'Hare interview, 39]






[Phillip Mann: The Eye of the Queen (1981)]


That, I think, is as far as Wulfsyarn can take us in this particular direction. It's not the limit of Mann's thinking on the subject, however. His first science fiction novel The Eye of the Queen (1981) still probably remains his most philosophically dense.

His hero's final choice to be absorbed into an alien "queen" in order to reemerge - through the complex processes of her digestion - as an altered form of intelligence has a kind of extremist fervour about it which appears to have died down a little in his subsequent, more nuanced (arguably less passionate) works.

The Master of Paxwax series, too, belies its resemblance to other intergalactic empire sagas such as Asimov's Foundation or (above all) Frank Herbert's Dune series, by ending with a neat volte-face where the aliens end up triumphant over the apparently all-powerful - but actually enslaved by their own limited, technological viewpoint - imperialist human "Families."

I don't have space here to go on to talk about his next vast project, the four-volume alternative history A Land Fit for Heroes (1993-1996). Some have seen that as turning away from this fruitful territory of the questions raised by the alien and the robot in favour of a more limited ecological agenda, but that, I think, would be a misreading.

In any case, check the shelves for copies of his books next time you're in a bookshop. I'm sure you won't regret any time you spend on them. My only criticism of Phillip Mann is that he doesn't write - or publish - quickly enough. I for one would love to have a new novel (or set of novels) to pore over.



Monday, June 14, 2010

Phillip Mann's Pioneers


[Phillip Mann, Pioneers (1988)]

For the past few years I've been collecting books by Phillip Mann whenever I run across them in second-hand bookshops (or - in the case of the Land Fit for Heroes series, public library sales). Why? Initially it was because Don Smith recommended Wulfsyarn to me as a great example of the "android theme." But after that I just got hooked. Here are the results of my efforts to date:

Phillip Mann (1942- )

  1. Mann, Phillip. The Eye of the Queen. 1982. London: Grafton, 1988.
  2. Mann, Phillip. Master of Paxwax: Book One of the Story of Pawl Paxwax, the Gardener. 1986. London: Grafton, 1988.
  3. Mann, Phillip. The Fall of the Families: Book Two of the Story of Pawl Paxwax, the Gardener. 1986. London: Grafton, 1988.
  4. Mann, Phillip. Pioneers. 1988. London: Grafton, 1990.
  5. Mann, Phillip. Wulfsyarn: A Mosaic. 1990. London: VGSF, 1991.
  6. Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 1: Escape to the Wild Wood. London: Victor Gollancz, 1993.
  7. Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 2: Stand Alone Stan. London: Victor Gollancz, 1994.
  8. Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 3: The Dragon Wakes. London: Victor Gollancz, 1995.
  9. Mann, Phillip. A Land Fit for Heroes. Vol 4: The Burning Forest. London: Victor Gollancz, 1996.





'How long have I been ill, recovering, in prison, whatever?'

'Almost eight weeks.'

'So long?'

'Only an adapted creature such as you would have survived. It's a wonder your body held together. And you will have lots of scars to tell your grandchildren about.'

'Shut up.'

'Sorry, that was a saying from the time when I was a boy. But you are alive, that is the main thing.'

'Is it?'

'You're not going to get silly are you. Listen, I've been alive a lot longer than you and I've seen a lot more ... I've seen a lot more than you could stomach of life and death. Grieve for Ariadne, yes. Grieve for your friends, yes. But you will live to fight again. Do you think they would want you to give up?'

'Oh shut up will you. Don't start morali - '

'Only the Ariadne you knew is dead. You can make another. '

He said this quietly and it stopped me. I thought briefly of the cold tanks in the back room of our ship. It was absurd, rude, insulting to the memory ...

'Why you .. .'

He moved his arm and I saw the gun he held, glowing red, fully charged, ready to burn but not to kill. 'I thought you'd react this way. Silly Chimp. Get a hold of yourself. Think. Damn you. Start to think. Go over to the window there.'

I obeyed.

'Now look down. Read what you see. The history of the world is the history of bereavement. Think how many people have walked, and kissed and died down there. You should think yourself lucky. You at least had a woman who loved you. What do the rest of us have?'

I didn't answer him but stared down at the milky rivers that wandered through the dark bush. We were already close to the volcanic region. I saw pits of yellow sulphur and dark green lakes which opened like holes in the bush. Vaguely, though I could not have given clear expression to the thought, I associated the suffering of the land with the grief that was now beginning to work through me.

'And if ever you get thoughts of attacking me because I tell you the truth, remember that I am watching you and I will set fire to your fur, but I won't kill you. Only stop you.'

He got up quietly and went to the door that led to the pilot's cockpit and slipped through, closing the door silently.

I found that when he had gone I couldn't settle. I wanted to grieve easily and steadily, but my mind was like a kitten that runs after one dancing string and then chases another.

Ariadne diving into water and laughing as she shook her hair; the strange grave woman April, with her spread of antlers; Bonniface waving a pig bone; the silver moun­tain; the dead-faced doctors who had shaved me; Murray, smug after love-making .... And below me the dark green hills moved past. I felt older and different. I looked at my huge scarred hand and the joints that flexed. 1 felt still and dry.
Murray was right. Life goes on and all that Time achieves is to leave its mark on you. Suddenly I was thinking about our ship and the sleeping clone that waited inches below the surface. What would Ariadne do if she were now standing in my place? Ariadne would know what to do. That clear and thoughtful woman had all the right instincts. I remembered how she had made me bomb the island of the ants. Remembering her fierceness and her strength did something strange to me. I suddenly thought that she was not dead. She was close to me. Hell, she was in my mind and in my fur. I felt a strange kind of elation. And even as I felt that elation, I felt a hollowness and knew that I would have to face many dark hours alone.

The helicopter began to lower and I saw familiar land­marks. We flew round the margin of the lake and over charred stumps and gaping gutted buildings. This was all that remained of the old mining town. There were no people. [pp. 192-93]

This passage from Pioneers (1988), one of Mann's most interesting books, exemplifies some of what first attracted me to his writing. The two speakers are Angelo, a "part-human" bred for the purpose of deep-space exploration, and Pioneer Murray, one of the full-humans Angelo is programmed to find and bring back to a post-apocalyptic Earth denuded of natural resources and biological diversity.

Murray has just saved Angelo's life after an appalling battle with the ignorant full-humans who still linger in odd settlements here and there in the few habitable parts of Aotearoa. Angelo's partner Ariadne was not so lucky, however. She died in the fight.

Or did she die? Part of the pre-planning for Angel and Ariadne's expeditions is the provision of a fully-functional and periodically-updated clone for each of them. Now that he knows that Ariadne is dead, Angelo's dilemma is whether or not he should revive her clone.

What would Ariadne do if she were now standing in my place? Ariadne would know what to do. That clear and thoughtful woman had all the right instincts. I remembered how she had made me bomb the island of the ants.

Angelo has recently developed an odd addiction to writing down all the incidents of his life (a fairly frequent Mann-ian device - witness the automated dictaphone Wulf in Wulfsyarn (1990). He's already told us of their unfortunate visit to the planet of the ants whilst attempting to retrieve yet another of the many pioneers which an ebullient, self-confident Earth sent out before the final catastrophe.

In this case they found the pioneer serving as a kind of combination hive-queen / food-basket for a race of super-evolved ants. Ariadne was the one who insisted that they bomb the island, destroying pioneer and ants alike - evolution should be permitted to go only so far in her view. The other pioneers they recovered had subsisted in a number of forms: winged, antlered, aquatic and so on - but this insect adaptation went far beyond what was acceptable to her, despite her only "part-human" status.

I watched the young man closely. 'Aren't you afraid of us" I asked as I took the tea carefully with my claw. 'Since we returned, most people seem to treat us warily.'

'Well you're just a ...' Pedro seemed to be searching for words. 'You're just a clever monkey, aren't you? Big but harmless.'

'And her?' I said nodding towards Ariadne.

He looked confused. 'Well she's a ... she's a woman, isn't she?'

I shook my head. 'No, We're the same," I said. 'Both adapted, despite appearances.'

He couldn't accept this thought.

'Angelo,' called Ariadne, 'stop trying to confuse the boy.'

He looked from one of us to the other. Me, ginger and giant and with a claw as big as my head. Ariadne, like a dream on legs.I watched him struggle.

'Oh hell, he said finally, 'the world is crazy.' [129-30]


Appearances are everything in the world they have returned to (Einsteinian relativity means that hundreds of years elapse on earth during each one of their expeditions. By now little memory is left of Angelo and his kind. Nor is the distinction between his "adapted" self (furry, ape-like, with a huge claw) and that of Ariadne (completely woman-like in appearance) readily comprehensible to this new generation who vaguely attribute the disaster to just such outrages against nature. Ariadne may look like a woman, but she lacks one crucial attribute of a woman: fertility. All of Angelo and Ariadne's kind are sterile, which explains his angry reaction to Pioneer Murray's gibe about having a tale "to tell your grandchildren about," above.

Angelo does indeed decide to reactivate Ariadne's clone, only to find that the clone denies any real identity between the two of them:

'I am not Ariadne. I might have been Ariadne. I have her memories but I don't have her experience. Memories aren't experience.' [227]

She writes out Ariadne's name backwards: ENDAIRA, and eventually settles on that as a new name for herself: Aira, for short.

"Curiously in her anger she was identical to the Ariadne I remembered" is Angelo's conclusion on the matter, though he is willing to recognise a number of other character discontinuities between them.

To say that Pioneers is about identity would be like saying that The Outsider is about existential doubt. Everything in the book is designed to complicate our view of what it is to be "intelligent," "conscious," "sentient" - let alone "human."

The first thing an awakened intelligence does is ask questions. [226]

The second thing, apparently, is to start to tell stories:
'Look, what I'm telling you is true. Heightened a little, that's the art of storytelling. But true all the same.' [330]

as Pioneer Murray puts it.

I ... stared down at the milky rivers that wandered through the dark bush. We were already close to the volcanic region. I saw pits of yellow sulphur and dark green lakes which opened like holes in the bush. Vaguely, though I could not have given clear expression to the thought, I associated the suffering of the land with the grief that was now beginning to work though me.' [192]

I think one of the things I like best about this particular book, though, is the strong sense of New Zealand-ness about it.

It's the only one of Mann's books of which this could be said. The Eye of the Queen, the Master of Paxwax series and Wulfsyarn are all set off-world, and his Land fit for Heroes tetralogy is set in an alternate-history version of Yorkshire (where Mann is from originally) - a Yorkshire which the Roman empire never retreated from.

In Pioneers, though, we get all the complexity of Mann's feelings for his adopted country: the long dark island lying between Wellington's pristine bays (cleared of humanity by the tidal waves of the disaster), to the space port at "Master Town", to Rotorua mining town (home of the returned pioneers, and scene of the terrible, unprovoked fight between Angelo and his friends and the intolerant full-humans), and finally to the ramshackle remains of Auckland. It's a kind of greeny vision of what the island should be but never quite has been. Mann's elegy for the complexities of our lost culture perhaps rings less true than the pleasure he obviously takes in this returning natural world.

I like, too, the materiality of Mann's concept of a book. For him (here, as elsewhere) it's a very physical artefact whose existence has to be accounted for within the story:

Kier has his woven basket and I have my papers, each one carefully written out by hand. Ariadne once asked me for whom I am writing. At that time I had no clear answers. Now I know. I am writing them for myself and no matter if they burn with me in space or end up sodden and trampled. Something was said. Something was done. [214]

Angelo, in the end, is both ape (in appearance) and angel (in name). The gentleness of his character is belied by the fearsome nature of his genetically-engineered claw and barrel-chest. Each act of compassion or fearlessness on his part is accompanied by a kind of antiphonal chorus

Programming, you see, bloody programming. [352]

But is it programming? And, if so, Nature's, or the manmade kind? Pioneers proposes no answers, but it asks (for me) all the right questions. Less cerebral than some of his other books, it benefits from a very intense sense of place - futuristic landscapes evoked with a kind of longing precision reminiscent of Wells's Time Machine or Richard Jefferies's After London.

Could this be still be called specifically New Zealand SF? I don't think it's a particularly important question. Mann was living here in NZ, having emigrated from the UK as a young man, when he composed all his major fictions (I'm pleased to report that his Wikipedia page claims he's now working on a new novel). Something in the fusion of these two places, the inevitable sense of (on the one hand) displacement and (on the other) acclimatisation has enabled him to create Angelo and to make his world ring true.

I'm not sure that there's that much new to be said about androids and humans after the Cyborg Manifesto and all that eighties cyberpunk. Phillip Mann's own personal contributions to the subject are distinguished, it seems to me, by a disarming diffidence, masking the elegant clarity of his conceptions. He's as much a poet as he is a writer of hard SF.