Showing posts with label Alan Turing. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Alan Turing. Show all posts

Monday, July 22, 2024

Operation Mincemeat


John Madden, dir. Operation Mincemeat (2021)


How was it John Lennon put it in "A Day in the Life" (1967)?
I saw a film today, oh boy
The English Army had just won the war
A crowd of people turned away
But I just had to look
Having read the book
Things haven't changed all that much in the sixty-odd years since then. The English Army are still winning the war, only now they're mostly doing it by being fiendlishly clever and outfoxing the Germans at their own game ...


Ewen Montagu: The Man Who Never Was (1953)


But then, I too have read the book: in this case, Ewen Montagu's best-selling account of just how smart he and his chums at Naval intelligence had been in planting a bunch of forged letters on the body of a fake officer and floating it onto the coast of neutral Spain.

The idea was to persuade the German high command that the Allies' next objective, after their successful North African campaign, would be to invade Sardinia and Greece - not the actual (and most obvious) target, Sicily.


Ben Macintyre: Operation Mincemeat (2010)


Not everything about this operation could be revealed in 1953 - in particular, the existence of Ultra intelligence - so another book has now been written to bring the story up-to-date: Ben Macintyre's Operation Mincemeat: The True Spy Story that Changed the Course of World War II.

But did it? Change the course of World War II, that is? Opinions seem to differ on that one. "The full effect of Operation Mincemeat is not known, but Sicily was liberated more quickly than anticipated and losses were lower than predicted", is Wikipedia's verdict.
Ultra decrypts of German messages showed that the Germans fell for the ruse. German reinforcements were shifted to Greece and Sardinia before and during the invasion of Sicily; Sicily received none.
On the other hand, Michael Howard, in his book Strategic Deception in the Second World War (1995):
while describing Mincemeat as "perhaps the most successful single deception operation of the entire war", considered Mincemeat and Barclay [the larger scheme of "bogus troop movements, radio traffic, recruitment of Greek interpreters, and acquisition of Greek maps"] to have less impact on the course of the Sicily campaign than Hitler's "congenital obsession with the Balkans."

Thaddeus Holt: The Deceivers (2004)


Thaddeus Holt, in his own exhaustive history The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War is particularly critical of the way in which Montagu's book - possibly through no fault of his - has led many people to assume that this was the only important piece of deception going on at the time of the invasion of Sicily.

John Madden's film goes far further in this respect. There's scarcely a moment where one character or another isn't emoting away about how their work could alter the course of the war, save thousands of lives, and affect the whole history of civilisation.

Ian Fleming, who did indeed have a minor role in the real Mincemeat operation, is also given an exceptionally pompous - and rather out of character, for anyone who's ever read one of his thrill-a-minute books - John le Carré-esque monologue to intone from time to time to spike up the action.

Giles Keyte: Operation Mincemeat (2021)
l-to-r: Colin Firth, Matthew Macfadyen & Johnny Flynn
Ian Fleming: [narrating while typing] In any story, if it's a good story, there is that which is seen, and that which is hidden. This is especially true in stories of war.
... There is the war we see, a contest of bombs and bullets, courage, sacrifice, and brute force, as we count the winners, the losers, and the dead.
... But alongside that war, another war is waged. A battleground in shades of gray, played out in deception, seduction, and bad faith. The participants are strange. They are seldom what they seem, and fiction and reality blur. This war is a wilderness of mirrors in which the truth is protected by a bodyguard of lies. This is our war.
All in all, it certainly seems to have the makings of a rattling good yarn. The story is a fascinating one - true, too (for the most part) - and all the usual suspects from the pantheon of British acting are there in strength.

That it doesn't quite succeed in this endeavour is mainly down to Michelle Ashford's rather mawkish screenplay. For a start, did we really need the (completely fictional) love triangle between Colin Firth, Matthew Macfadyen and Kelly MacDonald?

A rather portly Colin Firth, who plays former-King's-Counsel-turned-spy Ewen Montagu, looks far more interested in glugging down another glass of whisky than having a quick snog with his nattily turned out junior Kelly MacDonald (Jean Leslie).



Exactly what part the moustachioed Matthew Macfadyen - impersonating the actual brains behind the operation, Charles Cholmondeley - imagines himself to be playing is unclear to me. Certainly he does the worst job of trying to pick up a girl in a cinema, and subsequently in a nightclub, and finally in the office, that I've ever seen.

And yet Macfadyen succeeded completely in reinventing himself as a wolfish corporate predator in the Succession (2018-23) TV series. Why didn't they give him some of that material to work with here?

The point of this post, however, is not so much to slag off the film, which I did still enjoy - though it seemed to me that it could have been considerably better with a little judicious pruning of its longer, more weepy scenes - than to talk about its larger implications as a guide to prevailing British attitudes towards the Second World War.



The book above, which I picked up recently in a second-hand shop, is a condensation of Nigel Hamilton's exhaustive three-volume, authorised biography of Field Marshall Montgomery (1981-86), possibly the most controversial figure in Second World War historiography.

Monty's version of the war in Europe - expressed in his numerous volumes of memoirs, and repeated more or less verbatim by Hamilton's official biography - was that it could easily have been won by the end of 1944 if only the Americans had left him in overall command of all Allied ground forces after the breakout from Normandy.

Failing that, if they (meaning Eisenhower and his bosses in Washington) had just listened to Monty's suggestion that most of the available resources and manpower should be allocated to him in order to conduct his single-thrust attack into Northern German - rather than frittering it away on side-shows such as General Patton's advance in the South, and the subsidiary landings in the South of France - then he would have mopped up the Nazis easily.


Chester Wilmot: The Struggle for Europe (1952)


This is certainly the view accepted immediately after the war by such influential witnesses as Australian war correspondent Chester Wilmot. It also ties in nicely with the English view of the Americans - both troops and generals - as inexperienced and over-confident. Not to mention the "over-paid, over-sexed, and over here" mythology of discord between the two nationalities, as expressed with supreme wit and pin-point accuracy in the classic British sit-com Dad's Army (1968-1977):


Dad's Army: My British Buddy (1973)


The question remains, though, was Monty the supreme strategist he claimed to be? Were all of his reverses - Caen, Arnhem - other people's fault? Was it feasible to have so notoriously touchy and undiplomatic a general in charge of an army consisting predominantly of American rather than British troops?

Anxious as they are to promote Montgomery's virtues, the Brits suffer from the supreme disadvantage of not controlling Hollywood. Their occasional successes there come as flashes in the pan in a more uniform tale of American exceptionalism.


Steven Spielberg, dir. Saving Private Ryan (1998)


Take that propaganda masterpiece Saving Private Ryan, for instance. There's a scene early on where Ted Danson, playing a hardbitten combat officer, has a brief dialogue with Tom Hanks (Captain Miller):
Captain Hamill: What have you heard? How's it all falling together?
Captain Miller: Well, we got the beachhead secure. Problem is Monty's taking his time moving on Caen. We can't pull out till he's ready, so...
Captain Hamill: That guy's overrated.
Captain Miller: No argument here.
That line about Monty being "overrated" has led to apoplectic exchanges up and down the internet. This, for example, from the History forum Historum (4/2/2014):
this comment about Monty being ''overrated'' was factually wrong, even if some US troops said it at the time.

The pre-D-Day plan was for Monty and the Canadians to take on the bulk of the SS and German armour (which were behind Caen), whilst the less-challenged US troops (in the western flank) in Brittany, under the dashing Patton, would break out (as they did) and deal a mighty blow in the enemy flank. Which they did.
Which was answered, later that day, as follows:
I'm one of Montgomery's detractors. He is overrated, in my view. He had a chronic case of the slows that, while might have resulted in less initial casualties, may well have caused more casualties in the long run. As for Montgomery at Normandy, I might buy the argument that Monty was supposed to take the brunt of Rommel's reserve allowing the Americans under Bradley (Patton was still commanding a fictitious army in England) to break out IF the historical record supported that. It does not. Carlo d'Este has proven convincingly that that thesis was an invention by Monty after the fact.

... I might also buy that my view of Monty was a product of my American viewpoint IF I viewed all British generals as incompetent (I don't - Alexander and Slim were both exceptional, in my view) and all American generals as able to move mountains (I'm not a huge fan of Mark Clark, George Patton, and mostly Dugout Douglas MacArthur). Why is it that criticism of Monty must be based on national agenda?
"Endless are the arguments of mages," as Ursula K. Le Guin once put it - or, as in this case, of historians and history buffs.


Antony Beevor: D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (2009)


If there is a concensus, though, I'd say that my own reading of some of the more recent accounts of D-Day by a range of historians, American and British - in particular, Stephen E. Ambrose and Antony Beevor - has led me to the conclusion that few of them now accept that Monty's failure to capture Caen on the day of the invasion was somehow "intentional."

Nor do many writers now repeat that idea of a "pre-D-Day plan" which involved little or not movement on the part of British and Commonwealth troops in order to "set up" a breakthrough by the Americans. That is indeed (more or less) what happened, but whether it was planned that way, as Monty's advocates continue to insist, seems increasingly doubtful. The facts appear to be otherwise.

The supreme argument for American bluster and incompetence against British calmness and professionalism is, of course, Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, the so-called "Battle of the Bulge." This was certainly an avoidable disaster, and Eisenhower apologists (such as the late Stephen Ambrose) have a difficult job arguing otherwise.

Whether Monty made a decisive contribution to the containment of the German forces on that occasion is debatable - his fans say yes, his detractors no - but one thing is for certain, the crowing press conference he gave on the subject destroyed once and for all any chance he had of being given command over any more American troops.


Richard Attenborough, dir. A Bridge Too Far (1977)


What's more, the complete - and equally avoidable - débâcle which was Operation Market Garden, the airborne assault on Arnhem and the single road leading to it, was presided over and largely designed by Montgomery. Though he attempted later to shuffle off the blame, this should have put paid to his reputation as a master strategist or tactician on the level of Marlborough or Wellington.

Hollywood has had a good deal to say on that subject also - not only in the classic war movie A Bridge Too Far, scripted by William Goldman from Cornelius Ryan's book (albeit with an English director and a largely British cast), but also in the supreme act of American triumphalism that is the TV mini-series Band of Brothers, created by Tom Hanks and Steven Spielberg in tandem:


Richard Attenborough, dir. Band of Brothers (2001)





Morten Tyldum, dir. The Imitation Game (2014)


"Strange all this difference should be / 'Twixt Tweedledum and Tweedledee" ... Who did actually win the war on the Western Front? Well, if it hadn't been for British intransigence and stubborn refusal to admit that they were defeated in 1940, there wouldn't have been a war to win - there or anywhere else.

Without the resources (both in troops and matériel) provided by the Americans, there couldn't have been a successful invasion of Europe in 1944 or at any other time.

But then, for that matter, without the titanic victories of the Red Army at Stalingrad and Kirsk, the Germans would probably have been able to marshall the resources to overwhelm the fragile Allied bridgehead in Normandy.

All these great nations made immense sacrifices for their common cause - the Russian people far beyond any others. Maybe it's time to suspend these nationalistic squabbles, then, and admit the virtues as well as the vices of the squabbling British and American generals in Italy and Western Europe?

They do, admittedly, read like a pack of prima donnas at times - more concerned with their own press coverage and the number of stars on their shoulders than with winning the war. But, after all, they were victorious. And the Germans were far from being negligible adversaries at any stage.

The Imitation Game is another interesting test case in this discussion. It's far more fictionalised even than Operation Mincemeat, though one can see the dramatic reasons for that. It's also a far better film, mainly due to a taut script and excellent performances from its stellar cast.


Alan Turing (1912-1954)


But, once again, while no praise is sufficient for the genius of Alan Turing, it's a shame that the immensely important part paid by the Poles in the long saga of breaking the Enigma cipher had to be left out entirely from the cinematic record:
The German plugboard-equipped Enigma became the principal crypto-system of the German Reich and later of other Axis powers. In December 1932 it was "broken" by mathematician Marian Rejewski at the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau, using mathematical permutation group theory combined with French-supplied intelligence material obtained from a German spy. By 1938 Rejewski had invented a device, the cryptologic bomb, and Henryk Zygalski had devised his sheets, to make the cipher-breaking more efficient. Five weeks before the outbreak of World War II, in late July 1939 at a conference just south of Warsaw, the Polish Cipher Bureau shared its Enigma-breaking techniques and technology with the French and British.
The Imitation Game ends with the statement that the deciphering of the German codes may have shortened the war by two years, and thus saved vast numbers of lives. However, "according to the best qualified judges", these Polish contributions "accelerated the breaking of Enigma by perhaps a year."

Once again, the plucky little Britain narrative has to be pushed at the expense of historical truth. Those of us who "read the book" may know of the superhuman efforts already made to crack Enigma long before Bletchley Park was even born or thought of, but filmgoers are encouraged to see it as yet another example of inspired English amateurism winning the day over stultifying professional inertia.

Perhaps we need to go back as far as the 1962 wide-screen epic The Longest Day, based on the bestseller by Irish-journalist-turned-US-citizen Cornelius Ryan, to see anything resembling even-handed treatment of the respective contributions made by these warring nationalities to their eventual, hard-won success. Would it hurt us so much to try to emulate that attitude today?


Darryl F. Zanuck, prod.: The Longest Day (1962)





Friday, March 13, 2015

Ramon Llull and Curriculum Mapping



Ramon Llull: Ars magna (1305)


Yesterday I went to an interesting meeting where it was explained to us just how the - relatively new - concept of curriculum mapping could help us improve our teaching programme. There are many forms that this can take, but the one which was explained to us consisted of a listing of the "graduate attributes" considered essential for students in particular degrees or subject areas within degrees, together with a list of the papers we teach, and a series of boxes to fill in confirming that we do indeed teach those particular things.

So far, so harmless: useful, even (perhaps). I note in particular the following passage from the wikipedia article on curriculum mapping, which concludes:
The curriculum needs to be perceived as a 'work-in-progress', a 'living and breathing' document, whose ultimate owners are students. Curriculum mapping is a 'process', not a one-time initiative. Traditional curriculum mapping software are just tools available to make the review process easier.
There's no doubt that obtaining an overview of something as complex as a major within a degree can be very difficult - and hence an impressionistic sense that "we must talk about that somewhere" often stands in for certainty that we really do cover things with the requisite detail and emphasis.



One example of a dynamic system which functions extremely well would be the periodic table of the elements. Dmitri Mendelev originally lined up the elements (on little cards) according to their atomic weights as a kind of after-dinner parlour game. He observed that at a certain point he needed to start a new row in order to match up the same kinds of elements with one another: in his system there were six rows, but this has been subsequently enlarged to fit in hydrogen and helium.

The point is that it wasn't till some time afterwards that the reasons for this periodicity were discovered: the fact that it was the number of protons in each nucleus that dictated their place in the scheme. The atomic weight, the factor he was using, was a far cruder indicator. Nevertheless, the whole system - with certain modifications - worked, and enabled him to predict the existence of various new elements which were subsequently discovered in nature (or, in some cases, fabricated in the laboratory).



Ramon Llull: Tree and Wheel (1305)


I guess the other thing curriculum mapping reminds me of, though, is the Catalan polymath Ramon Llull's wheels (and trees) of science from his 1305 work the Ars Magna (or Great Art). Basically his idea was that if one could summarise all the attributes of God - which come down to Goodness, Greatness, Duration, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, and Glory - into one wheel, which interlocked with other wheels of natural elements, planetary influences, and bodily humours, it should be possible to make a kind of machine for generating knowledge.

Any question (theoretically) could be coded onto the wheels and receive a satisfactory answer which must be demonstrably true, since these things were guaranteed to be so by the very nature of the First Cause.

I suppose it's apparent at once how much information theory and digital computers owe to Llull's pioneering work (not dissimilar, in its way, to that of Alan Turing: at any rate in the over-simplified form portrayed in The Imitation Game, the recent film about him).



I guess the main problem with Llull's system, from a modern point of view, is the arbitrariness of the terms he was using. How, for instance, does God's Glory differ from his Virtue? Llull could no doubt have explained the distinction with great cogency, basing it on the best models of theological commentary available to him, but the results might still be a bit unconvincing.

He himself felt no doubts, however. When he visited Tunis in 1314 and tried to explain to a crowd of Muslims that the logic of his system demanded that they all immediately renounce their beliefs and convert to Christianity, he was greeted with a volley of stones. Though rescued by a group of Genoese merchants, he died the next year, probably as a result (though he was in his 80s, so it may not have been).

His other model for generating truth from interlocking ideas is the Tree of Knowledge (L'arbre de ciència). This, too, suffers from the lack of an empirical basis for the words and concepts he regarded as primary and undeniable.



Curriculum Mapping (civil engineering) (University of Hawai'i at Manoa)


Now my own feeling about all such exercises in codification is that they tend to promote uniformity and lessen creativity and originality. It isn't that I think that either of these aspects should predominate in any course design: institutions must maintain some control over just what is being taught in its classrooms, and how that ties in with other classes in the same discipline. By the same token, though, teachers are individuals, and teach in their own ways - and have to teach differently according to the particular students they're faced with.

There's no reason per se why a system such as curriculum mapping should interfere with that necessary freedom a teacher must feel to temper their teaching style to particular complex circumstances. That is what we're hired to do, after all. But (as a colleague of mine has put it): "templates control pedagogy." Once you have a particular model, there's a tendency to see everything in terms of that set of predetermined categories.

Nor is it enough to ask teachers to list all the possible variations from the existing curriculum categories and try to revise them accordingly. The mere fact of having to list such categories puts the assumptions behind them further and further off the agenda. The categories become real. Departures from them have to be justified and explained. What began as mapping has become prescription.

In this particular case, the battle is already lost (or won: depending on how you look at it). The curriculum mapping exercise will go ahead, and we're all soon going to be spending a good deal of time debating just how the projected learning outcomes of our courses match up with the graduate profiles of our degrees. And it's hard to argue against that process - in the abstract, at any rate.

I do feel a niggling doubt when I think of Ramon Llull, however. The second law of thermodynamics tells us that disorder always increases. While there can be local exceptions to that rule (the entire evolution of life on earth, from less to more complex organisms, might be seen as one such exception), it's beyond doubt that chaos tends to increase, and that attempts to arrest it in its tracks can have strange consequences.

For myself, I would predict that the more regimented course content and course outcomes become, the more creative classroom practice will become. If one wished to draw an analogy with poetry (as I so often do), it's just as futile to privilege content over form as it is to prefer form over content. Neither can function without the other, and it's only the proportions and relationship between the two which is really worthy of debate.

Our accountability as teachers to the students we teach must be taken very seriously: this does entail looking carefully at what we cover and how. On the other hand, bored, unmotivated students learn little. Nor do they rejoice at the idea of being cogs in some giant wheel of information. The best way to convince students that you really have something of value to teach them is to invoke your own creativity by learning along with them.

For Llull, the universe was sewn up. Everything that needed to be known was already known - it was just a matter of explaining that clearly, in words of one syllable, to potential dissenters, and then the millennium could be proclaimed!

That's not how knowledge works, though. Ideas change. Models shift. What we teach in 2015 is very different from what we were teaching even a couple of decades ago. Who would ever have though of demanding "digital literacy" from students then? We have to leave some space to react to changes when it comes, and any new mapping systems we devise must start with that very firmly in mind.